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and Indonesia†
By Sean Lewis-Faupel, Yusuf Neggers,  
Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande*
This paper examines whether electronic procurement (e-procure-
ment), which increases access to information and reduces personal 
interactions with potentially corrupt officials, improves procurement 
outcomes. We develop unique datasets from India and Indonesia and 
use variation in adoption of e-procurement within both countries. 
We find no evidence of reduced prices but do find that e-procurement 
leads to quality improvements. In India, where we observe quality 
directly, e-procurement improves road quality, and in Indonesia, 
e-procurement reduces delays. Regions with e-procurement are more 
likely to have winners come from outside the region. On net, the 
results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from higher qual-
ity contractors. (JEL D72, H54, H57, L12, O17, O22, R42)
Contestable government procurement of goods and services has been estimated at over 7 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD 2002), with the 
incidence rising in emerging economies. For instance, in 2007, the Indian govern-
ment spent over US$21 billion ($18 per capita) on the procurement of external goods 
and services, over double what it spent in 2000 (International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2008)). Yet, both the quantity and quality of recently constructed public infrastruc-
ture often remain low (Briceño-Garmendia, Estache, and Shafik 2004). A limited 
supply of local qualified contractors, collusion among contractors, and corruption 
among public officials have each been cited as important reasons (Kenny 2007).
A number of governments have responded by adopting electronic procure-
ment (henceforth, e-procurement) (Leipold and World Bank 2007). Broadly, 
 e-procurement is the implementation of a technological platform as directed by a 
potential buyer (a government agency or firm) to facilitate transactions between that 
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buyer and potential sellers of goods and services. Commonly, the practice includes 
electronic postings by the buyer of products and services desired for procurement. 
There is often an online method for potential suppliers to offer those goods or ser-
vices requested by the buyer, under a contract and price either preordained by the 
buyer or offered by the potential seller. As with traditional procurement, there is 
typically a method for choosing among contracts or prices offered by the poten-
tial sellers. In some cases, this selection process is performed automatically by the 
technology.1 In other cases, e-procurement consists of contracted sellers provid-
ing a set of goods or services at fixed prices from which the buyer can choose as 
needed. Additionally,  e-procurement may allow for the electronic transfer of funds 
as agreed upon in the procurement contract. Finally, the technology can facilitate 
a review by the buyer of the goods or services delivered by the contracted seller, 
which may be communicated to the seller, considered when enforcing contracts, 
and used by the buyer in future procurement decisions. We describe the specifics of 
the  e-procurement reforms in the Indian and Indonesian contexts in the next section.
E-procurement can potentially address three common concerns with manual 
procurement practices: lack of access to bid information, collusion among bidders, 
and corruption. By lowering the costs of obtaining information about a tender pro-
cess, e-procurement may increase the number of firms who can bid. Likewise, it can 
reduce bidder collusion by providing tender information to firms outside a local car-
tel, allowing non-cartel firms to participate, and breaking up local bidding cartels. 
E-procurement can also mitigate corruption by reducing government officials’ abil-
ity to selectively withhold information or refuse electronic bids from non-favored 
bidders. Moreover, by ensuring public access to all procurement data,  e-procurement 
enhances transparency and the possibility of public oversight.
However, it is plausible that in low income settings, where information technol-
ogy coverage and other aspects of state capacity remain low, e-procurement can 
only affect limited change and can potentially make things worse. Potential con-
tractors (who are currently not in the system) may continue never to learn about 
available tenders, and cartels and corrupt officials may continue to use strong-arm 
tactics to prevent entry by such contractors. If many small firms have limited access 
to the Internet, requiring electronic bids could harm competition.
In this paper we examine the impact of electronic procurement on public works 
projects in two large emerging economies: India and Indonesia. In India, we exam-
ine procurement practices between 2000 and 2009 for a federally funded rural road 
construction program which is implemented by state road departments, the Pradhan 
Mantri Gram Sarak Yojana (PMGSY) program. Under this program, roughly 
145 road packages were tendered per state per year. In Indonesia, we examine con-
tract data from the national Ministry of Public Works for both construction and con-
sulting (e.g., engineering management and design) contracts each year. On average, 
32 consultancy and 58 construction packages per province were issued each year. 
1 The system may also allow potential sellers to electronically submit other supporting documentation, such 
as resumes or technical capabilities, or allow the buyer and potential sellers to communicate electronically. 
Additionally, e-procurement may be used to record and archive any number of other data points of interest to the 
buyer. 
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The gradual rollout of e-procurement (at the state level in India and province level in 
Indonesia) allows for a difference-in-differences strategy: we compare outcomes in 
states/provinces before and after the adoption of e-procurement, as well as in those 
continuing under manual procurement practices, allowing us to quantify the benefits 
or costs of the practice in both countries.
For both countries, we obtained administrative data on the complete universe of 
contracts from before and after e-procurement by scraping publicly available infor-
mation from respective government websites. In Indonesia, we have bidding and 
final contract data for all tenders; in India, the website publishes final contract data 
but not the details on individual bids. All told, this leaves us with a dataset of over 
20,000 contracts in India and over 14,000 tenders in Indonesia. In addition, in India, 
we hand collected bidding data on tenders for four states which we use to supple-
ment the administrative data.
We first show that, in both India and Indonesia, e-procurement increases the prob-
ability that the winning bidder comes from outside the region where the contract 
takes place. This is consistent with e-procurement decreasing the costs of submit-
ting bids for those not physically present. We next examine the impact on the ulti-
mate outcomes of interest: price, quality of construction, and timeliness. We find 
no systematic evidence that electronic procurement lowers prices paid by the gov-
ernment. In Indonesia, the point estimates are consistent with small (2–5 percent) 
reductions in prices, but these are not statistically significant. In India, final prices 
are unaffected. Overall, we can statistically rule out (at the 5 percent level) declines 
in contract values of more than 2.7 percent in India, of more than 6.6 percent for 
Indonesian consulting projects, and of more than 14.1 percent for Indonesian works 
contracts.
In contrast, e-procurement led to quality improvements, albeit along different 
dimensions in the two countries. A first measure of quality is time-overrun in project 
completion. Reports of corruption of procurement in India typically focus on cases 
where works are abandoned halfway through or completed in a very tardy manner. 
In our data we see that 77 percent of road projects in India and around 95 percent 
of public works projects in Indonesia are completed late. In India, we observe no 
statistically significant changes in late works, while in Indonesia these declines are 
large and significant—whereas only 5 percent of conventionally procured construc-
tion projects in Indonesia are completed on schedule, 20 percent of electronically 
procured construction projects are on time.
A separate indicator of quality, only available for India, is an independent audit 
report on construction quality, which was conducted identically in roads completed 
under both e-procurement and traditional procurement. According to this measure, 
we find that e-procurement leads to higher quality roads, with the quality grades 
rising by about 12 percent in e-procurement projects compared to other projects.
We then explore the degree to which the results are driven by improving out-
comes among already winning bidders, as opposed to changing who wins. To see 
whether the observed changes in outcomes reflect changes in selection of who wins, 
for the key variables of interest—price, delays, and quality—we estimate a fixed 
effect for each contractor and examine how e-procurement changes the average 
quality characteristics of winning contractors (i.e., the fixed effects of who wins). 
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We find that after e-procurement, winning contractors in India tend to be those who 
have higher quality on average. In Indonesia, we find evidence that those contractors 
who win after e-procurement are systematically less likely to be late. This suggests 
that a key mechanism for e-procurement is allowing higher quality contractors to 
enter and win projects, rather than simply encouraging better performance from 
an existing set of contractors. Increased entry of contractors could reflect better 
information flows and/or reduced ability of local contractors to prevent others from 
filing tenders.
This paper is related to several economic literatures. While there is a growing 
body of work which examines procurement (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009; 
Krasnokutsaya and Seim 2011), much of the literature has focused on the award 
procedures (i.e., scoring auctions versus lowest-price auctions, etc.) (Tran 2008) 
and potential interactions with other procurement regulations (Decarolis 2014). This 
paper suggests that an important component, at least for ensuring quality, can be in 
the implementation of the procurement auction, holding these rules fixed. It also 
contributes to a growing literature using procurement data to examine corruption 
(Di Tella and Shargrodsky 2003; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Bandeira, Prat, and Villetti 
2009; Bobonis, Fuertes, and Schwabe 2010; Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 2013).
Second, past work has highlighted the role of media and technology in shaping 
the political and policy landscape. Strömberg (2004) suggests that media access 
among constituents may make politicians more responsive to voters, while Falck, 
Gold, and Heblich (2014), Jaber (2013), and Campante, Durante, and Sobbrio 
(2014) measure causal impacts of Internet access on political participation. Our 
paper complements this previous literature by considering how new technology, in 
this case implemented by government itself, may improve the outcomes of a gov-
ernment initiative.
Finally, this paper is part of a recent, broader agenda that documents the role 
of communication technology in development. While there are several studies that 
document the impact of cell phone technology on market access (Jensen 2007; Aker 
2010) and education (Aker, Ksoll, and Lybbert 2012), this paper represents one of 
the first studies to examine the impact of the Internet on governance issues.
One advantage of our approach is that we use the same methodology to study 
separate e-procurement programs in two different countries. To the extent that the 
findings from both countries are similar, the external validity of our results is given 
credence. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents one of the first micro-
economic studies that uses difference-in-differences to simultaneously evaluate 
a new program in multiple countries, allowing for more careful conclusions with 
respect to external validity.2
The paper is structured as follows: In Section I, we describe the institutional details 
relating to procurement practices and road construction in India and Indonesia. In 
Section II, we describe the data and empirical strategy. In Section III, we report the 
findings. Section IV concludes.
2 The other study of this nature we are aware of is Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), which evaluates the impact 
of state and provincial cigarette tax changes in the United States and Canada. 
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I. Background
We start by describing the public works programs in our two study countries, 
followed by the nature of e-procurement adopted in these two settings. We conclude 
the section with a brief description of likely channels of influence of e-procurement.
A. India
Public Works Program and manual Procurement.—In the year 2000, India 
launched a large-scale rural road construction scheme called “Pradhan Mantri Gram 
Sarak Yojana” (PMGSY). The federal government provides funding for this scheme 
and coordinates program implementation, but full executional responsibility lies 
with state governments. Each state has a rural roads department which decides the 
schedule for road construction and manages procurement. PMGSY roads follow 
uniform criteria for road construction in terms of material usage and quality for all 
Indian states.
For PMGSY, all states use the same procurement rules and standardized bidding 
document, provided by the national roads agency. The procurement process follows 
a cost-based auction procedure. Specifically, conditional on meeting a prespecified 
set of technical qualifications intended to ensure a contractor is capable of complet-
ing the project, the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. Importantly, these rules 
are identical for manual and electronic procurement.
Anecdotally, public procurement in India is rife with corruption, and claims of 
impropriety exist throughout the contracting process. Contractors have reported 
being physically intimidated or barred from submitting bidding documents. The 
handling of bidding documents after submission has also been called into question 
with claims of altered bids, inspection of bids prior to technical reviews, and inten-
tional loss of submissions. There is also concern that technical qualifications are 
used to unreasonably exclude certain firms from the bidding process. The implica-
tion of many of these reports is that government officials collect rents in exchange 
for some advantage in the bidding process.
As a case study, we examined the tendering process for manual procurement 
for a random sample of 188 road contracts issued between 2001 and 2005 in the 
Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. As Figure 1 shows, there is very little competition in 
PMGSY contracts. In 95 percent of cases, the price bid of only one firm was eval-
uated; that is, there was only one bid submitted or all other bids were disqualified 
based on technical requirements. When we observe multiple bids here, over three 
quarters of the time all but one bid are disqualified. In the case of any technical 
disqualification, all but one bidder are disqualified 100 percent of the time. Prima 
facie this pattern of disqualifications is consistent with corrupt officials enforcing 
a desired winner.
In 2000, when the program began, all Indian states used a manual paper-based 
procurement system to bid out contracts to private contractors. This process involved 
obtaining internal approval of the project, publishing a Notice Inviting Tenders 
(NIT) in several media outlets (typically newspapers), having suppliers obtain 
detailed bid preparation materials from the government, receiving bid submissions 
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from suppliers, receiving bid evaluations by buyers, and finally, the awarding of 
the procurement order and signing of agreements. The complete process required a 
long chain of internal authorizations (at times involving several departments), sev-
eral visits by suppliers to departments, and the generation of reams of paper-based 
statements and evaluations.
E-procurement.—The Indian IT Act of 2000 provided legal recognition to elec-
tronic transactions. Since then, several Indian states have passed legislation enact-
ing e-procurement, and the rural roads department in several states followed by 
adopting e-procurement practices for road construction. The implementation of 
 e-procurement for PMGSY typically involves placing all invitations for tender into 
an online, searchable database. An online portal is also established that allows autho-
rized users (contractors) to upload bidding materials. The Indian  e-procurement sys-
tems prohibit procurement officials from viewing contractor names and viewing or 
editing price bids before completing the technical certification process, in theory 
preventing favoritism in the selection process. Given the above description of how 
most bidders are disqualified during the technical stage, this is potentially important 
for preventing corrupt practices. Finally, much of the electronic data is stored after 
auctions are completed, creating the potential for accountability.
We exploit this variation across time and states for our empirical analysis. Our 
sample covers 27 Indian states and territories during the period January 2000 
through August 2009. During this time frame, nine states adopted a system of elec-
tronic procurement. Figure 2, panel A shows the dates when e-procurement rules 
were adopted in various states through August 2009. The first state to adopt, in 2004, 
was Andhra Pradesh, which (along with Karnataka) is one of the technological lead-
ers of India. (Note that in some states (Chattisgarh, Gujarat, and Orissa), contracts 
which are below a state-specified cost threshold do not go through the electronic 
procurement process and are processed on paper. Since the threshold may respond 
endogenously to the auction policy (see, e.g., Tran 2008), during the applicable peri-
ods, we classify all projects as electronically tendered in these states.)
Number of technical disqualifications
Number of bidders 0 1 2 3 4
1 155
2 5 14
3 1 5
4 3 4
5 1
Total 164 14 5 4 1
Figure 1. Number of Contracts by Number of Technical Disqualifications  
and Number of Bidders
Notes: This figure presents bidding data from a random sample of 188 road contracts issued 
between 2001 and 2005 in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (prior to e-procurement). Each 
cell is a count of tenders with the respective number of bidders and technical disqualifications. 
Technical disqualifications are intended to prevent a bidder who lacks the necessary expertise 
or equipment from competing. Blank cells indicate zeros. Note that the diagonal comprises all 
cases of all-but-one disqualified.
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Panel B. E-procurement adoption—Indonesia 
Panel A. E-procurement adoption—India
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009, Jan–Aug
Post-data collection
Not applicable
Figure 2. E-procurement Adoption
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B. Indonesia
Public Works Program and manual Procurement.—In Indonesia, we examine the 
national Ministry of Public Works (MPW). The MPW procurement process covers 
mainly two types of contracts—works and consulting. Works contracts refer to proj-
ects such as the building or repairing of roads and bridges, where physical services or 
construction work are conducted by the contract winner. Access to heavy equipment 
and various construction materials is therefore typically a necessary component for 
these projects. Consulting contracts, in contrast, entail the provision of professional 
expertise by the winning bidder in planning or supervision services such as design 
and management. Depending on the project, procurement takes place either at the 
national headquarters in Jakarta or at the provincial offices of the MPW.
Works and consulting contracts additionally differ in the structure of their bid-
ding processes. Works contracts are generally assigned to the low bidder condi-
tional on meeting minimum administrative and technical qualifications, as in India. 
Consulting contracts involve a prequalification phase in which potential bidders first 
submit a document containing administrative, financial, and work experience infor-
mation. A shortlist of firms meeting minimum qualification requirements are then 
invited to submit technical and cost bids. The winning bidder is assigned using a for-
mula based on a combination of technical score and price, rather than simply lowest 
bid conditional on meeting minimum technical requirements as with works projects. 
For both types of contracts, a minimum of three bid submissions are required; other-
wise, the processes are repeated. The overall pool of bidding firms consists of both 
private firms and state-owned construction firms, with state-owned firms competing 
against the private sector without any special preferences.
Public procurement is widely considered “one of the most corruption-ridden 
sectors” (Freedom House 2012) in Indonesia. For example, the 2009 Enterprise 
Survey of Indonesia (World Bank International Finance Corporation 2009) sam-
pled 1,444 firms comprising a representative sample of the nonagricultural formal 
private economy in the country. In the survey, 38.1 percent of respondents who 
had attempted to secure a government contract in the previous year indicated that 
firms with characteristics similar to theirs make informal payments or give gifts 
to public officials to secure such contracts, though the average value given for 
these bribes was only 1.8 percent of the total contract value. A separate survey of 
792 randomly sampled construction, consulting, and supplier firms conducted in 
2010 by the Indonesia Procurement Watch (Indonesia Procurement Watch 2011) 
provides further suggestive evidence of corruption in the government procurement 
process, with 92.7 percent of respondents answering that they thought their firm 
had ever given bribes to the government officials involved in managing procure-
ment. Additionally, 97.3 percent of respondents believed that it was not possible to 
win the contract tender without bribery and more than 95 percent indicated that the 
typical value of a bribe was more than 10 percent of the contract value. Beyond sur-
vey results, of the 196 cases considered by the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) of the government of Indonesia between 2004 and 2010, 86 dealt with brib-
ery and graft related to the procurement of goods and services, and every such case 
resulted in a conviction (Onishi 2009, Parlina 2011).
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the manual procurement process contributes to 
the corruption problem in much the same ways as discussed in India. For example, 
government officials may not make the detailed documents required to prepare a 
bid available to non-favored firms or purposely misinform them about the proper 
submission process (UNAFEI 2008). Alternatively, there could be physical intimi-
dation of firms that are not part of the cartel from submitting bids.
E-procurement.—Indonesia began rolling out a “semi-electronic procurement” 
(SEP) system in 2004 in the central ministry in Jakarta and expanded the procedure 
across the 33 provincial offices in approximately concentric circles from Jakarta 
over the next 5 years, as shown in Figure 2, panel B. The rollout plan was devised 
from Jakarta and followed a standard pattern in Indonesia: rollout started in Java, 
spread to the most developed provinces in Sumatra and Sulawesi next, and then was 
progressively rolled out throughout the country. Under SEP, firms are able online to 
register expressions of interest, to download detailed bidding and technical quali-
fication documents, to submit prequalification materials, and to post questions and 
complaints. However, due to a regulatory constraint, the final submission of bids 
was still required to be conducted manually (hence the term “semi”) throughout the 
period we study. The SEP process thus covers the entire procurement process except 
the final submission of bids. There was no change in procurement rules associated 
with the switch to SEP; procurement still followed the presidential guidelines for 
the procurement of government goods and services issued in 2003 (Government of 
Indonesia 2003).3
Prior to the adoption of SEP in a province, procurement was in a “copy-to-In-
ternet” (CTI) phase where the acquisition of bidding and technical qualification 
documents and the submission of bids were carried out manually, but the contract 
details (bids of each firm and the winner) were posted to the Internet ex post to 
be publicly available. Crucially for our analysis, the data made public during the 
 copy-to-Internet and semi-e-procurement systems are identical and in fact use the 
same electronic platform; the only difference is that procurement actually takes 
place electronically on the SEP system, whereas in copy-to-Internet, information is 
just released publicly ex post. We discuss the data in more detail below.
C. E-procurement: channels of Influence
There are several mechanisms through which e-procurement could affect out-
comes. First, e-procurement could change the composition of bidders. By placing 
bidding documents online and allowing interactions online rather than in person, 
 e-procurement facilitates bidding at a distance; on the other hand, since it requires 
Internet access, it may be more difficult for unsophisticated bidders. Second, 
 e-procurement may increase the enforcement of government rules and regulations. In 
the manual procurement system, the paper trail and threat of audit ensure that rules 
are complied with, but this is imperfect; e-procurement adds an additional layer of 
3 Full e-procurement was not introduced until after the period under study. 
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intermediation, where the computer system itself enforces certain procedures. Third, 
e-procurement may prevent denial of access to non-favored suppliers. For example, 
in a manual procurement system, a procurement official could, for a supplier outside 
of a prespecified cartel, claim that there were no copies available of bidding docu-
ments or refuse to accept a bid. The e-procurement system cannot be manipulated in 
this way and provides access to all equally. Finally, even if outcomes are not changed, 
if e-procurement costs less for the government to administer than a manual procure-
ment process, it could still be beneficial to the government (Singer et al. 2009).
The impact of these changes on prices and quantities is ambiguous for several 
reasons. First, while most of these effects of e-procurement are “positive” (in the 
sense of increasing competition and/or reducing the possibility of corruption or 
collusion), there is one potential downside, namely that it may make access more 
difficult for bidders with low Internet availability or low levels of computer skills.
Second, even conditional on “improving” outcomes for the government, it is not 
ex ante obvious whether this improvement will come in the form of lower prices, 
improved quality, or both (Asker and Cantillon 2010). If e-procurement facilitates 
the entry of high quality firms from farther away (say, high quality firms located in 
the capital city), one might expect quality to rise; prices might even rise as well. On 
the other hand, if e-procurement facilitates the entry of more firms of similar quality, 
the impact could either be a fall in prices (if existing firms bid the same quality as 
before but reduce prices in light of more competition) or an increase in quality (if 
existing firms increase quality of their proposals for the same price). Either way, 
these ambiguities suggest that it is important to measure the impacts on both prices 
and quality when considering the net impact for the government.
These arguments hold true under a competitive model with no collusion or cor-
ruption, but similar arguments can be made in cases of corruption, as well. For 
example, in a corrupt world where the most efficient contractor can pay the highest 
bribe (as in Tran 2008 and Asker 2010), e-procurement, even if it eliminated the 
bribes, would not necessarily change the identity of the firm winning the contract 
(Burguet and Che 2004). It would, however, potentially reduce the price. On the 
other hand, if there was heterogeneity in firms’ willingness to pay bribes, so the 
most efficient firm was not necessarily the one with the highest willingness to pay, 
eliminating corruption might also result in a different firm winning the contract and 
potentially higher quality (Celentani and Ganuza 2002).
Of course, all of these effects could potentially be muted if the requests for pro-
posal changed in response to e-procurement. For example, one might imagine that 
in response to an intervention that made it more difficult for a procurement offi-
cer to direct a contract to a particular bidder, the officer might change the contract 
requirements such that only the desired firm could satisfy them. While this issue 
could arise, at least in India this is unlikely to be a major force since the Indian road 
specifications are largely fixed by PMGSY program guidelines.
II. Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe the Indian and Indonesian datasets, followed by our 
empirical strategy.
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A. Data
India.—We obtain administrative data on costs, quality, and delays associated 
with each PMGSY contract issued between January 2000 and August 2009 from 
multiple PMGSY websites. The dataset covers 27 Indian states. For PMGSY, some 
road packages (sets of construction projects and funding allocated by the federal 
government) are split into multiple tenders, each with its own contract covering a 
subset of roads in the package. As a result, our final dataset covers (at least partial 
information for) 30,578 packages and 35,610 associated contracts.
A first set of outcomes are the cost outcomes associated with each contract. 
The estimated cost is the amount budgeted (or “sanctioned” in the terminology of 
PMGSY) by the national authority for construction of a specific road or set of roads 
in a package. A contract or payment above this amount can only occur with per-
mission from the national offices. The contract value is the amount the government 
agrees to pay the winning firm for the relevant work. The final payment records the 
total amount paid out for each package, which as discussed above, may be distrib-
uted among multiple contracts and includes any amendments to the contract that 
occur during construction.
We have measures of two key aspects of project quality: timeliness and physical 
project quality. For timeliness, we track the time to execution. We use “late com-
pletion,” which is an indicator variable taking value one if road construction work 
is not completed by the date agreed to in the initial contract. We also construct a 
continuous “time overrun ratio” variable, which is the ratio of actual to agreed upon 
time to completion.
To measure the quality of project implementation, we use quality reports sub-
mitted by the National Quality Monitors (NQMs). During construction, PMGSY 
has a multitier quality monitoring system, with local, state, and national monitor-
ing. National monitoring is conducted by NQMs, who are retired engineers from 
other states. The assignment of packages to NQMs is randomized and is therefore 
conducted similarly in places with and without electronic procurement.4 We focus 
on the outcomes of this national monitoring as our quality outcome. NQMs eval-
uate each part of the work for material and workmanship as per the format of the 
standardized “NQM Inspection Report,” indicating the tests carried out and the test 
results obtained. Overall grading includes management issues, contract manage-
ment, and quality of work. We use a binary assessment (satisfactory/unsatisfactory) 
of the technical fitness of the road at the time of inspection.
For a subset of packages in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, 
and Uttar Pradesh, we have bidding data. This includes the total number of bids sub-
mitted in each auction. Before submitted bids are unsealed, engineers in each state 
decide which firms have the technical ability (in training, equipment, and experi-
ence) to complete the project based on materials firms submit with their bid. We 
4 The NQMs are given the letter of request once every two months for carrying out inspection for the forth-
coming two months. The NQMs are required to inspect three districts in a single visit in one state in each of the 
two months. The letter of request allocates a mix of works in progress and completed works. The letter indicates 
the specific location of works to be inspected and which are in-progress or completed works. Within a block (the 
administrative unit below district), projects to be inspected are chosen on a random basis. 
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also observe how many of the submitted bids in each auction are judged to be from 
technically qualified firms.
Indonesia.—We scraped data from the CTI and SEP websites of the Indonesian 
Ministry of Public Works, capturing the complete universe of procurement from 
2004 through 2008. Over 14,000 contracts from the MPW national headquarters and 
the 33 provincial offices are covered. Each entry in the data is at the contract level and 
specifies the estimated cost, which is, as in India, the maximum amount allowed by 
the MPW to be paid for a given contract. Information on the type of project is avail-
able, as are all bidder names, bid amounts, disqualifications, and final contract values.
We also have the dates on which the notice and details for each contract were 
first posted online (and concurrently in traditional media), as well as the dates of 
bid opening and contract award. For road projects (which represent a subset of all 
projects covered by the Ministry of Public Works), we have a separate database from 
the road division that tracks the start dates and expected and actual completion dates 
for the services associated with each contract. As with India, we construct “late 
completion” and “time overrun” variables. No direct quality measure is available 
for Indonesia. For regressions which consider as an outcome variable the above 
measures of the timeliness of completion, the number of firms expressing interest 
(i.e., registering to access bidding documents), or the number of firms bidding, we 
trim the top and bottom 1 percent of sample observations.
B. Descriptive statistics
In the first column of Table 1, we present a set of basic descriptive statistics for 
the Indian data, and in the remaining columns we present statistics from Indonesia. 
All monetary variables are in logs, which is the form in which they will be used in 
the regressions below.
Examining the Indian data, in an average year for the typical state, the govern-
ment sanctioned almost 145 packages worth 9.61 log lakh rupees (approximately 
US$33 million at exchange rates for 2005, the midpoint of our dataset; 1 lakh is 
100,000 rupees) covering over 6.74 log kilometers (525 miles) of road. At the pack-
age level, the average log estimated cost of completion over the period observed is 
5.21 log lakh rupees (about US$416,000). In the subset of auctions for which we 
have bidding data (as discussed above, these are from 4 states), there are an average 
of 2.7 total bids and 1.7 qualified bids.
One contract per package is the mode, but a long right tail is observed. On average, 
a package is associated with 1.25 contracts for which we have data. Roads contracts 
generally come in below estimated cost (most likely because exceeding estimated 
cost requires an additional bureaucratic process). However, cost overruns with respect 
to the contracted price are relatively common post-contracting. The average payment 
on completed projects exceeds the average contract value by about 46 percent.
Turning to delays and quality, completion before the contracted due date was 
rare, with more than three-quarters of contracts finished after the assigned deadline 
and an average delay of 244 days. There was heterogeneity in quality, with 72 per-
cent of projects receiving a satisfactory quality rating on first inspection.
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Examining the Indonesian data in Table 1, between 2004 and 2008 the average 
Indonesian province auctioned about 88 contracts per year, with nearly twice as 
many works as consulting projects, for a province-level average log total budget 
of 25.67 log rupiah (approximately US$15 million at 2006 exchange rates). At the 
project level, the average log estimated cost for works projects is 20.95 log rupiah 
(about US$140,000) and for consulting projects is 19.78 log rupiah (approximately 
US$43,000). The final contract value for a given project is on average 10 percent 
lower than the official estimated cost provided by the government prior to bidding. 
Firms winning contracts are typically based in the same province as the contract, 
more than 80 percent so for works projects. As with the data from India, delays are 
common; nearly all works projects (95 percent) and more than half of consulting 
projects (54 percent) are completed later than the initially agreed upon date.
Table 1—Summary Statistics
India Indonesia
All All Works Consulting
Mean Mean Mean Mean
(SD) Observations (SD) Observations (SD) Observations (SD) Observations
Panel A. state/province year level
Total projects 144.8 158 88.3 166 57.9 164 32.2 160
(184.9) (89.1) (40.3) (61.2)
log total budget 9.610 158 25.674 166 25.610 164 22.886 160
(1.469) (0.944) (0.918) (1.156)
Panel B. Package level
log estimated cost 5.211 22,378 20.540 14,657 20.952 9,502 19.780 5,155
(0.846) (1.311) (1.350) (0.799)
Contracts in package 1.251 22,378
(1.088)
log total value of 5.217 22,378
 contracts in package (0.908)
Satisfactory quality 0.715 11,200
 at first inspection (0.451)
Panel c. contract level
log contract value 4.529 26,659 20.433 14,623 20.826 9,491 19.706 5,132
(2.044) (1.322) (1.381) (0.799)
log final payment 4.914 14,813
(0.903)
Completion delay 244.3 13,781
  (days) (345.4)
Number of firms 28.837 14,409 33.468 9,329 20.333 5,080
 expressing interest (32.902) (38.967) (13.058)
Number of firms 2.756 1,628 5.842 14,521 7.298 9,414 3.158 5,107
 bidding (3.075) (4.617) (5.083) (1.364)
Time notice to award 99.544 10,423 84.393 6,810 128.102 3,613
(110.258) (100.478) (121.642)
Time bid open 29.616 9,199 27.476 5,975 33.583 3,224
 to award (29.672) (24.182) (37.477)
Winner won in 0.109 34,126 0.282 9,575 0.212 6,893 0.463 2,682
 first year (0.312) (0.450) (0.408) (0.499)
Winner from same 0.302 12,913 0.734 6,096 0.817 4,152 0.556 1,944
 district/prov. (0.459) (0.442) (0.387) (0.497)
Time overrun ratio 2.262 13,628 1.876 4,161 2.179 2,986 1.083 1,175
(3.018) (0.992) (0.991) (0.330)
Late 0.766 13,628 0.832 4,161 0.948 2,986 0.537 1,175
(0.423) (0.374) (0.223) (0.499)
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C. Empirical strategy
We estimate impacts separately for India and Indonesia. In both cases, we make 
use of a difference-in-differences strategy, but our implementation differs slightly 
across countries, as described below.
In India, for road package or contract  i in state  s which began in year  t , we esti-
mate the following OLS specification:
(1)  y ist =  α s +  β t + μEPRO c st +  X ist ′ γ +  ϵ ist ,
where  i is a package or contract,  s is a state, and  t is a year, and  EPRO c st is a dummy 
for e-procurement adoption by state  s as of year  t . Controls  X ist are log estimated cost 
and log road length.5 All regressions include state ( α s ) and year ( β t ) fixed effects. In 
some cases, we collapse the package-level data to the state level and estimate regres-
sions using annual state-level data. In all cases, we cluster standard errors by state.
In Indonesia, the availability of e-procurement at the province level does not 
necessarily imply that all projects within a province will be contracted using the 
system.6 To obtain the average impacts of the use of e-procurement, we instrument 
for actual e-procurement use with the adoption of e-procurement in the province, as 
follows. The regression of interest (i.e., the second stage) is:
(2)  y ist =  α s +  β t + θEPROcPAcKAg E ist + δ X ist +  ϵ ist ,
where  EPROcPAcKAg E ist is a dummy for e-procurement use in project  i in prov-
ince  s as of year  t . The project level e-procurement variable  EPROcPAcKAg E ist is 
instrumented with  EPRO c st , which is a dummy for whether e-procurement has been 
adopted by province  s as of time  t .7 The control variable  X ist is the log estimated cost (since we have many different types of projects and there is no metric available in 
the data other than estimated cost, we cannot control for road length as for India). 
Standard errors are clustered by province.
In our regression tables we typically report results for the India sample as panel A, 
Indonesia works projects as panel B, and Indonesia consulting projects as panel C.
D. Identification check
Since the adoption of e-procurement is not randomly assigned, we need to ensure 
that the timing of e-procurement adoption is not correlated with differential trends in 
procurement that would have occurred in the absence of e-procurement.
5 For India, the R2 values from regressions of e-procurement on log road length and log estimated cost range 
from 0.0004 to 0.081, depending on the year. For Indonesia, the R2 values from regressions of project-level 
 e-procurement on log estimated cost range between 0.001 to 0.022 for works projects and between 0.000 to 0.125 
for consulting projects, depending on the year. 
6 It is possible that this is true for India as well, but for India we do not observe what fraction of packages actu-
ally used e-procurement in a given year. 
7 The first-stage coefficient and F-statistic for works projects are, respectively, 0.359 and 40.79, and for consul-
tancy projects they are 0.491 and 78.11. 
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To examine this, we begin by checking whether, overall, the adoption of 
 e-procurement is associated with a change in the volume (total budget for procure-
ment) or structure (i.e., across how many contracts procurement is distributed) in a 
given state or province. Column 1 of Table 2 reports regressions where the dependent 
variable is log total estimated cost at the state-year level and the explanatory vari-
able of interest is an indicator for any contract being awarded under  e-procurement, 
with log of road length included as a control for India. Column 2 repeats the exer-
cise using number of projects as the dependent variable, controlling for log total 
 state-year estimated project cost. In neither country do we see a significant impact of 
e-procurement adoption on the total budget allocations (column 1) or the number of 
projects they are broken into (column 2) at the state/province level, suggesting that 
e-procurement was not coincident with major changes in the amount or structure of 
contracts being procured.8
8 We find a similar null result for e-procurement’s effect on log road length. See online Appendix Table 2 for 
these estimates. 
Table 2—Budget Impact
State-year level
log (total estimated cost 
at state-year)
Number of projects 
in state-year
(1) (2)
Panel A. India
E-procurement −0.041 −54.391
(0.089) (60.717)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 9.548 139.203
(1.413) (184.074)
Observations 157 157
Panel B. Indonesia—works projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.187 −3.559
(0.151) (7.069)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 25.211 45.102
(0.774) (28.803)
Observations 164 164
Panel c. Indonesia—consultancy projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.374 7.641
(0.226) (8.486)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 22.306 15.831
(0.888) (10.009)
Observations 160 160
Notes: India: Column 1 reports estimates from an OLS regression of log total estimated cost 
at the state-year level on an indicator for any contract being awarded under e-procurement in 
the respective state and year. Column 2 does the same using number of packages as the depen-
dent variable. Log of road length and log of estimated cost are included as controls when not 
on the LHS. Indonesia: Columns 1 and 2 give results from OLS regressions at the state-year 
level, where the dependent variable is given in the table and the independent variable is the 
official adoption of electronic procurement at the state level. Column 2 includes a control for 
log total state-year estimated project cost. Both regressions include state and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses below estimates. Means for each 
dependent variable are also reported, with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Second, we examine whether the year of official adoption of e-procurement at the 
state level (conditional on e-procurement occurring after the first two years in our 
data—that is, after 2005 in Indonesia or after 2001 in India), is significantly related 
to the difference in log average contract value between the first two years of the data 
(i.e., between 2001 and 2000 for India (Appendix Table A1, panel A) and between 
2005 and 2004 for Indonesia (Appendix Table A1, panels B and C)). Regressing 
these early contract value differences on e-procurement can suggest whether dif-
ferential initial trends predict the year of subsequent e-procurement adoption. We 
see no correlation between change in state-level contract value and the timing of 
 e-procurement for either India or Indonesia.
III. Results
A. Did E-procurement change the contracting Process?
contracting Execution.—In Table 3 we first examine whether the introduction 
of e-procurement has an impact on the duration of the project contracting phase. In 
columns 1 and 2, we consider the time elapsed between tender notice and contract 
award and between bid opening and contract award. Both variables are available 
only for the Indonesia sample. While neither variable is significantly impacted for 
works projects, we find an increase of 54.15 days (statistically significant at the 
1 percent level), a more than 50 percent increase, in the time elapsed between the 
tender notice and awarding of contract for consulting projects. In conjunction with 
the absence of an effect in column 2 on the amount of time between bid opening and 
award, this implies that for consulting projects e-procurement increased the period 
of time between the tender notice and the opening of bidding, in which firms can 
learn about potential contracts and prepare their bid documents.
Who Bids and Who Wins?—We next consider indicators of changing contractor 
identity. In column 3 of Table 3, we investigate the impact of e-procurement on the 
number of firms who express an interest in bidding. These data are only available 
for Indonesia. For nearly every works project, this process entails registering to 
be allowed to download the detailed bid documents and participate in bid submis-
sion. For all consulting projects and a small subset of works projects, expression of 
interest involves the submission of a prequalification document on which firms are 
scored and a subset of those passing are chosen to submit bids. The number of firms 
expressing interest in the case of works projects more than doubles.
In column 4 we examine the number of firms submitting a complete bid. This 
number is relatively low in India with the average manual procurement contract 
receiving roughly 2.9 bids. This number is higher for Indonesia at over 7 bids per 
works project and 3.2 per consulting project. However, in no instance does the aver-
age number of bids increase due to e-procurement.
Column 5 examines whether e-procurement changes the likelihood that the win-
ning firm is based in the same area in which a project is tendered. While a  variable 
for contractor home province was available directly in the Indonesian data, we proxy 
for firm default location in India with the modal district among those in which the 
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contractor was observed with contracts prior to e-procurement starting anywhere in 
the country.9 In general, as with most construction projects, where moving equip-
ment is quite costly and where there is often a need for local sources of materials 
(e.g., hot asphalt), there is a strong tendency to be local: in India nearly 60 percent 
of winning bids come from firms located in the same district and in Indonesia over 
80 percent of works contracts are won by firms from the same province.
9 In India, the only consistent firm identification data we observe is a unique ID within states, which does not 
link across states. Since some firms are not observed prior to the start of e-procurement, the location variable is 
undefined for these firms and the associated observations are excluded from this regression. 
Table 3—Contract Process
Time 
elapsed 
notice to 
award
Time 
elapsed 
bid open 
to award
Number of 
firms 
expressing 
interest
Number 
of 
firms 
bidding
Winner 
from same 
province/ 
district
Winner 
in 
first 
year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. India 
E-procurement 0.364 −0.108 0.0222
[0.733] (0.029) (0.0218)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 2.86 0.581 0.141
(3.52) (0.493) (0.348)
Observations 1,406 6,545 26,246
Panel B. Indonesia—works projects 
E-procurement (IV) 48.75 −2.54 24.735 0.420 −0.036 0.069
(38.24) (6.93) (13.657) (1.520) (0.057) (0.060)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 64.90 25.33 17.456 7.005 0.816 0.245
(71.20) (29.43) (21.460) (5.057) (0.387) (0.430)
Observations 6,804 5,974 9,323 9,408 4,151 6,892
Panel c. Indonesia—consultancy projects 
E-procurement (IV) 54.15 9.88 −3.489 −0.242 −0.233 0.414
(19.10) (6.19) (2.561) (0.281) (0.133) (0.183)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 98.01 26.13 11.069 3.178 0.650 0.446
(101.20) (48.53) (6.174) (1.468) (0.477) (0.497)
Observations 3,611 3,223 5,078 5,107 1,944 2,682
Notes: India: All columns report OLS estimates from a regression at the contract level of the listed variable on an 
indicator for the contract being awarded using e-procurement. Column 4 is estimated on a subset of contracts for 
which we have bidding data in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh. Column 5 
defines the district that a contractor is from as the modal district of the contractor’s observed contracts prior to 
 e-procurement starting anywhere in the country. This regression is therefore restricted to contracts won by the 
cohort of contractors who were awarded contracts prior to e-procurement. Winner in first year (column 6) is an indi-
cator for the winner having been awarded a contract in 2000 or 2001. This regression is restricted to observations 
after the first year. State and year fixed effects as well as controls for log of road length and log of estimated cost 
are included. Indonesia: All columns report IV estimates at the project level, where the dependent variable is given 
in the table and the independent variable is the contract-level use of electronic procurement, instrumented by the 
official adoption of electronic procurement at the state level. Values of time elapsed in columns 1 and 2 were avail-
able for a subset of provinces in 2004 and all provinces in subsequent years. Column 5 defines the province where 
the contractor is from as the province directly indicated in the data. This regression therefore excludes contracts 
based out of the national headquarters. Column 6 defines winner in first year as an indicator for the winner having 
been awarded a contract in 2004. This regression is restricted to observations after the first year in the data. State 
and year fixed effects as well as a control for log of estimated cost are included. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state level. Where brackets are used, p-values are given using the wild bootstrap method. Non-e-procurement proj-
ect means for each dependent variable are also reported, with standard deviations in parentheses.
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We observe a significant 11 percentage point decline in this variable in India 
and a 23 percentage point decline for consultancy projects in Indonesia. Given 
that it is much easier to move engineers geographically than to move heavy equip-
ment and asphalt plants, it is not surprising that the impacts for Indonesia—where 
 cross-provincial distances are much greater than the cross-district distances we 
observe in India—are concentrated among consulting projects.
Finally, we examine in column 6 whether e-procurement changed entry of new 
firms. Specifically, we examine whether the winning bidder was present and won 
a contract bid in the first year of our data (2000 or 2001 for districts in India or 
2004 for provinces in Indonesia). This regression is restricted to observations 
that fall in years subsequent to these initial years. We observe a highly significant 
increase of 41 percentage points for consultancy projects in Indonesia, showing that 
 e-procurement leads to more contracts being won by preexisting winning firms. 
Combined with column 5, this suggests that e-procurement leads to projects being 
won by preexisting firms from other provinces.
One consistent explanation for these findings is that e-procurement improves 
access to information for firms outside the area where procurement is taking place. 
This is a relatively larger benefit for firms that are farther away and may also favor 
preexisting firms with a documented record of success.
B. Did E-procurement change Procurement Outcomes?
There are three main outcome variables about which the government cares when 
procuring for the provision of a service/construction of a project: the price it pays 
for the contract, the timeliness with which the contract is executed, and the quality 
of work undertaken. In this section, we examine the impact of e-procurement on 
each of these three dimensions.
Prices.—To examine the impact on prices paid, we first consider impacts in each 
country on the contract value agreed upon between the winning bidder and the gov-
ernment. Column 1 shows no statistically significant impact in India on log contract 
value, conditional on the log length of the road and the log estimated cost of the 
road. The point estimate is quite small—0.02—and the 95 percent confidence inter-
val ranges from −0.027 to 0.064. This means that we can reject the hypothesis that 
there was more than 3 percent cost savings associated with e-procurement, based on 
the original contract value. For Indonesia, conditional on the log estimated cost, the 
point estimates for both works and consultancy projects suggest small reductions 
in log contract value, though they are not statistically significant. The confidence 
intervals suggest that, at 95 percent confidence, we can rule out price declines in 
Indonesia of more than 14.1 percent for works projects and of more than 6.6 percent 
for consulting projects.
Of course, the government does not care about the contract value, per se; rather, 
the more important measure is the actual amount paid to the contractor. Cost over-
runs are frequent, so as discussed above, the amount paid is typically higher than 
the contract value. Column 2 examines the impact on the final amount actually paid 
by the government, including any overruns or contract amendments. Values for this 
276 AmERIcAN EcONOmIc JOuRNAL: EcONOmIc POLIcy AugusT 2016
variable are only available for India. Note that the observation count falls substan-
tially here, since not all packages were complete at the time of data collection.10 
Again, no significant impact is observed. The point estimate for India is a 2.5 per-
cent drop in final payments, with the 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 
a 8.7 percent decrease to a 3.7 percent increase. Given the uncertainty around this 
point estimate and that of the effect on contract values, we are not able to infer 
whether changes in final payments, if any, came through shifts in contract values or 
changes in cost overruns. On net, the evidence in this section suggests that there was 
no statistically detectable impact on prices paid for projects, and to the extent there 
are effects we cannot detect, they are not overwhelming in size.
Project Timeliness.—We next examine the first measure of quality of execution: 
delays in the execution of projects. In column 3 of Table 4, we consider late comple-
tion—a dummy taking value one if a project is finished after the contracted comple-
tion date and zero otherwise.11 Late completion is very common in both countries. 
More than three-quarters of projects in India are completed late, while 95 percent of 
works projects and more than half of consultancy projects in Indonesia are not fin-
ished on time. In the case of Indonesian works projects, we see a significant 16 per-
centage point decline in this variable associated with the adoption of  e-procurement. 
We then consider the time overrun ratio in column 4. This is the actual time to com-
pletion divided by the contracted time to completion. For both India and Indonesian 
works projects, we observe high levels of overrun—on average, actual time to com-
pletion is more than double the contracted time. However, in neither country do we 
see a significant decline associated with adoption of e-procurement.12
Quality.—In the final four columns of Table 4, we turn to package-level physical 
quality measures from a nationwide auditing process. As described above, these 
data only exist for the India sample. The Indian National Quality Monitoring pro-
cess is coordinated centrally, and inspectors audit a randomly selected bundle of 
roads (both in progress and complete). Specifically, for auditing roads in a given 
season, the national monitor is told how many of each type of project (complete and 
ongoing) to sample and from which districts in a state. He then separately samples at 
random from the lists of projects provided by the state road department. In addition, 
inspectors are allocated follow-up audits for roads, and here, poorly graded roads 
are oversampled.
Thus, only the first quality grade is randomly selected. We examine two vari-
ables: the first quality grade and the minimal quality grade for the road project given 
by the national monitor. The minimum quality grade is the lowest quality grade 
given during any of the inspector evaluations across all contracts in the package. 
10 As we show subsequently, the date to completion is unaffected by e-procurement, so this type of sample 
selection is unlikely to be of concern. 
11 We do not find significant effects of e-procurement on target timeline length in either India or Indonesia. 
Results can be found in Table 1 of the online Appendix. 
12 Note that for Indonesian works, the point estimate on the time overrun ratio is positive while the dummy on 
late completion is negative. This is due to a few extreme outliers. If we trim the bottom and top 2.5 percent of obser-
vations, the coefficient and statistical significance in column 3 are essentially unchanged, but the point estimate in 
column 4 becomes −0.025, not statistically significant. 
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The quality score is measured as either 0 (unsatisfactory) or 1 (satisfactory). We 
separately consider quality outcomes for all projects (including those in progress) 
and for only completed roads.
In Table 4, columns 6 and 8, we find highly significant impacts on both the first 
and minimum quality grades for completed roads. E-procurement is associated with 
increases of 12.3 and 19.4 percentage points in the first quality grade and worst 
Table 4—Prices and Project Execution
Prices Delays Quality
log 
contract 
value
log 
final 
payment
Late 
completion
Time 
overrun 
ratio
First 
quality 
grade
First 
quality 
grade 
(cond. 
on 
completion)
Minimum 
across 
quality 
grades
Minimum 
across 
quality 
grades 
(cond. on 
completion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. India 
E-procurement 0.0184 −0.0249 0.00116 0.127 0.0113 0.123 0.0442 0.194
(0.0233) (0.0316) (0.0668) (0.233) (0.0277) (0.045) (0.0448) (0.033)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 5.198 4.959 0.779 2.337 0.710 0.827 0.584 0.778
(0.843) (0.794) (0.415) (3.117) (0.454) (0.378) (0.493) (0.416)
Observations 21,980 11,237 13,462 13,462 11,350 1,783 11,350 1,783
Panel B. Indonesia—works projects 
E-procurement (IV) −0.049 −0.161 0.122
(0.047) (0.089) (0.234)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 20.766 0.956 2.177
(1.329) (0.204) (0.976)
Observations 9,485 2,985 2,985
Panel c. Indonesia—consultancy projects 
E-procurement (IV) −0.023 0.348 0.143
(0.022) (0.231) (0.238)
Mean dep. var. (non-eproc) 19.502 0.610 1.110
(0.841) (0.488) (0.429)
Observations 5,130 1,175 1,175
Notes: India: Columns 1, 2, and 5–8 report OLS estimates from a regression at the package level of the listed vari-
able on an indicator for any contract in the package being awarded under e-procurement. Columns 3 and 4 report 
OLS estimates from a regression at the contract level of the listed variable on an indicator for the contract being 
awarded using e-procurement. The regression in column 1 is run on all packages for which one or more contract 
values were available. The values of multiple contracts in the same package were summed before taking the log. 
In column 2, final payment is the total amount paid out to contractors for work on the package, and the estimation 
sample consists of all packages for which some payment has been made. In column 3, late complete is a dummy for 
the project completion occurring after the contracted completion date, and time overrun ratio is the actual time to 
completion divided by the contracted time to completion. These two regressions are therefore run on all contracts 
for which both contracted and actual completion dates are listed. In columns 5 and 6, the first quality grade is the 
earliest quality report (satisfactory [1] or unsatisfactory [0]) for any work done by any contractor working on the 
package. The minimum quality grade in columns 7 and 8 is the lowest quality grade given at any time (across all 
contracts in the package). Columns 5 and 7 include all packages for which inspection data is available, while col-
umns 6 and 8 restrict to those packages which were complete when inspected. Column 5 also includes controls for 
complete at first inspection, first inspection year, and inspector. Column 6 includes controls for first inspection year 
and inspector. State and year fixed effects as well as controls for log road length and log estimated cost are included 
in all regressions. Indonesia: All columns report IV estimates at the project level, where the dependent variable is 
given in the table and the independent variable is the contract-level use of electronic procurement, instrumented by 
the official adoption of electronic procurement at the state level. All regressions include state and year fixed effects 
and a control for log estimated project cost. The delay-related variables in columns 3 and 4 were constructed using 
follow-up data available for a subset of projects from the roads division. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. Non-e-procurement project means for each dependent variable are also reported, with standard deviations in 
parentheses.
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quality grade, respectively. In contrast, we do not see any significant impacts on 
incomplete works (columns 5 and 7). The evaluation of incomplete projects may be 
inherently prone to greater measurement error because a project is behind schedule, 
being revised, or is simply not far along enough to be accurately judged. We see no 
evidence in the data that e-procurement leads to more abandoned (never completed) 
contracts or to a differential number of incomplete projects at the time of inspec-
tion, suggesting that the difference in significance of the quality estimates cannot be 
explained by e-procurement driving low-quality contracts to an even lower level that 
results in unfinished construction.
C. selecting Better contractors, or making Existing contractors Better?
We observe significant impacts of e-procurement on road quality in India and 
evidence of reductions in delays in Indonesia. We also find that winning contractors 
are more likely to come from outside areas. We now explore a potential channel 
of influence: whether e-procurement changed the pool of contractors who bid and 
caused better contractors to be selected.
To the extent that e-procurement improves outcomes, an important question is 
whether it does so by selecting better contractors, or by encouraging existing con-
tractors to perform better. Selection effects would occur if the main effects described 
above were primarily driven by e-procurement spurring new entrants, and if those new 
entrants won; treatment effects on existing contractors could occur if increased com-
petition or lower corruption led these incumbent firms to submit higher quality bids.
To investigate these possibilities, we conduct a two-stage strategy where we first 
estimate a fixed effect for each firm in the data. This measures each firm’s average 
quality. We then examine whether e-procurement leads to the selection of higher 
quality firms. If it does—and if these coefficients match the overall effects docu-
mented above—we can then conclude that selection effects play a large role. On the 
other hand, if e-procurement does not change average firm quality, then the quality 
and delay effects documented above must be arising through increased performance 
from a given set of incumbent firms.
For each outcome of interest  y , we initially estimate the following regression:
(3)  y icst =  τ c +  α s +  α t + δEPRO c st +  X icst ′ γ +  ϵ icst ,
where  τ c is a winning contractor fixed effect and  EPRO c st is a dummy for 
 e-procurement adoption in state  s as of year  t .13 We include state/province and year 
fixed effects and controls as before. We generate a full set of contractor fixed effects 
from this regression and then use them as the outcome variable in the following 
regression:
(4)  τ ist =  α s +  α t + β EPRO c st +  X ist ′ γ +  ϵ ist ,
13 For Indonesia, we additionally include the dummy variable,  EPROcPAcKAg E icst , to account for the fact 
that e-procurement adoption at the state level does not imply that all projects in that province will be tendered using 
e-procurement. 
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where  τ ist is the estimated  τ c from the initial regression for the contractor winning 
project  ist . The estimation is weighted by the inverse variance of  τ c (as estimated 
from the first stage). This regression asks how e-procurement affected the choice 
of which contractors won a given package.14 Standard errors are clustered by both 
state and winning contractor in each stage.
Examining prices in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we find no evidence suggesting 
that the introduction of e-procurement was accompanied in either India or Indonesia 
with the selection of winning firms that tend to make lower or higher winning bid 
amounts for a given estimated cost.
We then examine delays. In column 3, we see that for works projects in Indonesia, 
e-procurement was associated with firms that tended to be less late being more likely 
to win. The magnitude of the coefficient—0.058—is about one-third of the equiv-
alent magnitude in column 3 of Table 4—0.161—which suggests that one-third of 
the effect is driven by changes in selection, while two-thirds of the effect is driven 
by existing contractors performing better.
We also find substantial impacts on the average quality of contractors, as shown 
in columns 6 and 8 of Table 5. The magnitudes of these coefficients are between 
50 and 80 percent of those for the overall quality effects in Table 4. This sug-
gests that the quality effect is driven primarily by higher quality contractors being 
selected rather than by increased competition improving the quality of existing 
contractors.15
IV. Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first rigorous evidence on the impact of 
 e-procurement on contractual choice and subsequent contract outcomes. All told, 
the results present a consistent story. E-procurement appears to have led to increased 
ability of firms from outside the home region to win contracts. These firms, in turn, 
tended to be higher quality firms in general, as measured by their average delay times 
(in Indonesia) and average construction quality (in India). This led to improvements 
in the quality of roads and timeliness but no detectable changes in price.
Following the increase in competition among firms for contracts brought about 
by the adoption of e-procurement, a reduction in the rents accruing to winning firms 
may be expected to occur either through an increase in quality for a given price or 
a decrease in price for a given level of quality. In both the Indian and Indonesian 
settings examined here, we see evidence in support of improvements in quality for 
a given price. The fact that we observe changes on the quality margin, and that it 
14 For Indonesia as before, we use  EPROcPAcKAg E ist instrumented with  EPRO c st in this regression. 
15 In addition to improvements in terms of price and quality, ensuring the participation of smaller firms may be 
an outcome that is desirable from the perspective of the government and influenced by the structure of procurement 
(Krasnokutsaya and Seim 2011). To address the possibility of such effects here, in online Appendix Table 3 we 
examine whether winning contractors under e-procurement are more likely to be large firms, as proxied by whether 
they tend to be involved with larger projects. In India, e-procurement is associated with such a change when we con-
sider the outcome of log road length, but there is no significant impact for estimated project cost. In Indonesia, we 
see some increase in contractor size for works projects but it is very noisily estimated, while no effect is observed 
for consulting projects. These results suggest that e-procurement results in minor, if any, changes in the distribution 
of winning firm size. 
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occurs through changing which contractors win rather than the performance of a 
given set of winning contracts, suggests that the system prior to e-procurement was 
not necessarily selecting the most efficient firms, and that e-procurement may have 
improved efficiency even if it did not necessarily lower prices paid. It also suggests 
that the practice of giving contracts to the lowest price bidder likely contributed to 
greater inefficiencies on the quality margin.
Overall, our findings provide qualified support to the view that e-governance can 
improve the provision of public services. E-procurement was a partial reform, which 
changed the application process but neither the rules for technical qualification nor 
the requirement that the lowest price bidder receive the contract. Case study evi-
dence suggests that official discretion in determining technical disqualification is 
often an important way of limiting competition. Equally, emphasizing price over 
quality (as occurs when lowest price bidder always wins) implies that bidders build 
in their profit margins by cutting back on quality. E-procurement facilitated entry but 
Table 5—Two-Stage Contractor FE Regressions
Prices Delays Quality
log 
contract 
value
log 
final 
payment
Late 
complete
Time 
overrun 
ratio
First 
quality 
grade
First 
quality 
grade 
(cond. on 
completion)
Minimum 
across 
quality 
grades 
Minimum 
across 
quality 
grades 
(cond. on 
completion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. India
E-procurement 0.00206 0.00568 0.0119 0.218 0.0214 0.0973 0.0181 0.107
(0.01211) (0.01315) (0.0403) (0.154) (0.0201) (0.0460) (0.0253) (0.049)
Observations 18,745 10,161 9,997 9,997 9,346 1,789 9,346 1,789
Panel B. Indonesia—works projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.0642 −0.058 −0.127
(0.0546) (0.025) (0.138)
Observations 8,352 2,941 2,939
Panel c. Indonesia—consultancy projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.000007 −0.003 0.008
(0.00393) (0.068) (0.024)
Observations 4,371 948 955
Notes: India: The first stage is an OLS estimate, where the dependent variable is given in the table and regressed 
on a set of winning-contractor fixed effects. The second stage regresses the estimated contract fixed effects for each 
contract on an indicator for the contract being awarded using e-procurement. Coefficients on the indicator from 
the second stage are reported. In the second stage, observations are analytically weighted by the inverse of the 
 winning-contractor estimate squared standard errors. All regressions are run at the package level and are restricted 
to packages with one contract. State and year fixed effects as well as controls for log road length and log esti-
mated cost are included in the second stage, while controls for e-procurement, log road length, and log estimated 
cost are included in the first stage. Indonesia: Observations are at the project level. The first stage is an OLS esti-
mate, where the dependent variable is given in the table and regressed on a set of winning-contractor fixed effects. 
The second stage is an IV estimate, where the dependent variable is the winning-contractor coefficient from the 
first stage and the dependent variable is the use of e-procurement, instrumented by the official adoption of elec-
tronic procurement at the state level. In the second stage, observations are analytically weighted by the inverse of 
the  winning-contractor estimate squared standard errors. All regressions include state and year fixed effects in both 
stages as well as a control for log estimated cost in the second stage, while controls for log estimated cost, use of 
e-procurement at the project level, and adoption of electronic procurement at the state level are included in the first 
stage. Standard errors are clustered at the state and winning contractor levels. For descriptions of the dependent 
variables, see Table 4.
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left significant discretion with officials in determining qualification, and the bidding 
rules continued to prioritize low price over quality. Thus, it appears that the main 
impact we see can be attributed to gains from trade associated with having reduced 
barriers to entry. It is an open question whether a reform package that changes both 
the application process and also the process of selecting among bidders could lead 
to even larger gains in economic efficiency.
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